By Harold W. Anderson, Ph.D., M.A., M.Div.

Right must never be adapted to politics; rather, politics must always be adapted to right.
Emmanuel Kant
Emmanuel Kant believed that a lie was a lie and lying was and is always wrong. Do you agree? Most of my ethic students weren’t quite sure. Surely, they thought, a little lie—sometimes called “a white lie”—won’t hurt anything, would it? In fact, contrary to Kant, they would often hold that little lies are necessary. If your spouse asks you if a newly purchased clothing item looks nice, does it really hurt anything if you say “yes” even though you don’t really like it? By lying, you’ve spared hurt feelings…right? If you ask your child who broke the vase and they say, “I don’t know,” even though they know they broke it, are they really hurting anything? Are they just getting out of punishment? The vase remains broken no matter what they say. The little lie doesn’t really hurt in the long run…or does it? When a worker tells their employer that they are late because of an emergency at home instead of admitting they overslept, isn’t that lie justifiable especially if telling the truth might mean their job? After all, they have bills to pay and mouths to feed. Telling a lie seems the reasonable thing to do especially if it means keeping their job. None of these “white lies” seem to hurt anything, so what was Kant’s point? Why did this extremely intelligent philosopher hold that all lying is wrong…period?
The piece of Kant’s oeuvre that brings the issue of lying to the fore in a forceful way is an essay entitled “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy.” Here, Kant debates Constant, a French philosopher who holds that Kant’s intolerance of lying renders society impossible. According to Constant, anyone who would hold that you must tell the truth even if a crazed murderer came to your door demanding that you tell them where your friend was (the friend is hiding in your house) makes a sham not only of truth-telling, but the very notion of justice and virtue as well. So, Constant concludes, “To tell the truth is therefore a duty, but only to one who has the right to the truth. But no one has a right to a truth that harms others.”
Kant thinks it is impossible to determine where to draw the line between an acceptable lie and one that is not. The arbitrary nature of this line means that truth is held captive by the circumstances in which truth is entertained, and if that is the case, then a lie relativizes truth rendering it impotent. When truth becomes the servant of a lie, truth is erased.
Most of my students were sympathetic to Constant’s point of view. If telling the truth were to result in a friend’s death, they thought, then by all means lie! Crazed people who want to murder someone do not have a right to the truth. But in earlier works, Kant argued that one’s ethical obligations are defined by “categorical imperatives,” moral oughts that any reasonable person would want to uphold regardless of the circumstances. In other words, a categorical imperative is a maxim that is universalized in such a way that any rational person would want to act accordingly not just because it is their duty to do so but because doing so is the reasonable, and hence, the right or good thing to do. So, if as we said “One ought to tell the truth,” is a categorical imperative, no reasonable person would seriously consider doing differently under any circumstance.
Kant’s words, as Constant points out, certainly seem to indicate an inflexibility when it comes to telling the truth. Read what Kant has to say about this (all quotes taken from Kant, 1993):
For a lie always harms another; if not some other human being, then it nevertheless does harm to humanity in general, inasmuch as it vitiates the very source of right (pp. 64-65).
This is because truthfulness is a duty that must be regarded as the basis of all duties founded on contract, and the laws of such duties would be rendered uncertain and useless if even the slightest exception to them were admitted (p. 65).
For every man has not only a right but even the strictest duty to be truthful in statements that are unavoidable, whether this truthfulness does harm [but not wrong] to himself or to others. Therefore he does not himself by this [truthfulness] actually harm…the one who suffers because of it; rather, this harm is caused by accident…. For he is not at all free to choose in such a case, inasmuch as truthfulness…is an unconditional duty. (p. 66; all emphases are my addition).

These statements seem, well…quite categorical and do not allow for exceptions. It is good to tell the truth and all rational people should strive to do so. Indeed, Kant argues, this principle, this categorical imperative is one upon which all laws and courts in a civil society depend.

I’m not upset that you lied to me, I’m upset that from now on I can’t believe you.
Friedrich Nietzsche
In response to this, Constant accuses Kant of omitting the middle premise of his argument. What does this mean? Simply put, categorical imperatives are immune to experience. They don’t take into consideration the circumstances in which the situation took place. Therefore, Constant holds, categorical imperatives are meaningless abstractions because they don’t speak to the circumstance of life. Such reasoning, however, worries Kant. Why? Because, Kant thinks, it is impossible to draw the line determining when a lie is appropriate and when it is not. The arbitrary nature of this line means that truth is held captive by the circumstances in which truth is entertained, and if that is the case, then a lie relativizes truth rendering it impotent. When truth becomes the servant of a lie, truth is erased.
Kant’s point, I think, is an important one. Kant writes: And although by telling a certain lie I in fact do not wrong anyone, I nevertheless violate the principle of right in regard to all unavoidably necessary statements generally (i.e., the principle of right is thereby wronged formally, though not materially). This is much worse than committing an injustice against some individual person, inasmuch as such a deed does not always presuppose that there is in the subject a principle for such an act. (p. 67).
Morality (Right), Kant holds, is determined not by considering circumstances; instead, one must look at the big picture. The issue is not whether a lie might have saved a friend, but if one gets away with a lie, it is easier to lie over and over again, and if this begins to happen, then lying begins to define our context, a context that makes truth subservient to the lie. This might appear to be a slippery slope fallacy, but I think there is a point to be made here. It is found in the words “inasmuch as such a deed [i.e., a lie] does not always presuppose that there is in the subject a principle for such an act.” Put simply, a lie—any lie—is a betrayal of what we, as reasonable people, know is right. When we lie, we know that what we are doing is wrong. However, human beings are often driven not by the power of reason. Rather, knowing what is reasonable, we rationalize what is right to bend it to our own ends, even if the end is to save the life of a friend. But, and this is Kant’s point, society cannot be predicated upon rationalizations and if it is, and such rationalizations [lies] habitually form our pattern of responding to life’s circumstances, then society must inevitably be based upon a lie, which is the end of reasonable civilization and hence, the end of truth not to mention equality and justice.
Often the truth is in front of your face, but your eyes and heart are so full of lies that you can’t see it.
Shannon L. Alder

Let’s break this down. Telling the truth means being accountable to the truth we tell. So, if I say that I went to the store today, I am accountable for that act. Anyone who wanted to do so, could “fact check” my statement and discover that indeed, I went to the store. I was accountable to the truth. If, while at the store, I unintentionally backed into another parked car and didn’t inform the owner, being accountable for my whereabouts might also mean that I am held responsible for denting the car I backed into. The person fact checking me talked to someone who not only saw me at the store but saw me back into the car. Put differently, the truth led to accountability and ultimately responsibility for something I did. I am responsible for fixing the car. If I do so, I am financially poorer for my act, but society as a whole benefits. Taking responsibility for my actions, however, also benefits me for it helps me develop character. I become a man of my word. Telling the truth transcends my personal account and becomes the fabric of accountability and responsibility benefitting me and society as a whole. This is the big picture that concerned Kant.
But what if I lied? What if, knowing that I had backed into the car, I lied to my interlocutor, and told that person I had not gone to the store? What harm would have come of that? I might rationalize the lie by thinking that surely the person whose car was dented had insurance. They won’t be out that much I rationalize, and I would be just that much richer. I wouldn’t have to pay for the damage, and no one is the wiser. Except me. I knew I had gotten away with a lie, which helped me rob the person who I had backed into of what was rightfully theirs. Whether they have insurance does not enter the calculus. The fact remains that I did that which I knew to be wrong…I lied about it and for that I lacked character, accountability, and responsibility. Is this the type of person I would want all of society to consist of? If I am honest, I would have to answer this question with “no, it is not.” It does not change a thing if I believe that society consists of those sorts of people. If everyone is that way, I might rationalize, I may as well be the same. A bandwagon fallacy will not save me from my responsibility, nor will it allow me to rationalize what the character of a good citizen ought to be. To think otherwise not only diminishes me as a person, but it also leads to the demise of society, which is Kant’s point. Or as Kant warns, “Right must never be adapted to politics; rather, politics must always be adapted to right” (p. 67). Putting that into the language of this essay, truth must never be adapted to the rationalizing tactics of society; rather, society must always be adapted to the truth.

To put a finer point on it, the ethics that Kant imagines in his article is not from the perspective of an individual alone. While Kant’s philosophy is often addressed to the individual, in this instance Kant has the courts in mind. He is interested in what a person is liable for in a court of law. Or as philosopher Helga Varden (2010) comments, “At this point, it is important to note one more important aspect of Kant’s analysis of the murderer at the door. His primary aim is to establish how a public court of justice should consider cases where someone faces situations in which she could either tell the truth or lie to a potential wrongdoer” (p. 410). According to Kant, telling the murderer at the door the truth about their friend exonerates the truth-teller from legal liability for what happens afterwards. If, however, the homeowner lies to the murderer, the owner becomes an accomplice to whatever happens afterwards. That is, this person is “responsible for the bad consequences of [their] lie” (Varden, 2010, p. 410). Varden explains: “by unilaterally choosing to partake in the interaction, namely by lying about the location of the victim, the homeowner also becomes responsible for the unintended, yet bad consequences of the lie. The reason is that by lying you choose to take part in determining a particular course of actions by setting up a deceptive framework in which another acts” (Varden, 2010, pp. 410-411). So, Kant argues, tell the truth and you are free from any sort of judicial prosecution; tell a lie and you’re legally liable. “By unilaterally choosing to try to set up a deceptive framework for the murderer and his victim, even under the best of intentions, you run the risk of being wrong; by taking that risk, you incur responsibility for the bad consequences” (Varden, 2010, pp. 410-411).
What is the moral of this story? Hopefully, none of us will have a crazed murderer at our door demanding the whereabouts of our friend anytime soon. However, Kant not only defines our responsibilities to be truthful as a citizen, but he also holds that truth should be honored by the courts since it is truth that is the foundation of justice. If involved in a scenario of which a person is not guilty, then the right of the court is to determine that and release this person from criminal or civil liability. However, if caught in a lie, then a person’s liability may be placed in question by the court. That seems to make sense. Honesty serves justice; lies don’t.

Considering this simple conclusion, i.e., honesty serves justice; lies don’t, I am concerned that this may fall on deaf ears in our country today. Donald Trump told 30,573 documentable lies during his presidency (the Washington Post). That’s just over 21 lies per day. When we add to this the “Big Lie” he repeatedly tells, which claims that the 2020 election was stolen, there is reason for concern. The Big Lie has been debunked in more than 60 court cases where judges examined the allegations Trump was making and determined they were without merit. In addition, 86 judges ranging from state courts to the U.S. Supreme Court have rejected at least one post-election lawsuit filed by Trump. 38 of these judges were appointed by Republicans, and the Supreme Court included three justices appointed by Trump himself (Politifact). Trump has also been charged with 91 felony accounts ranging from a time prior to his presidency to times following it, and has been found guilty of lying about his sexual abuse of E. Jean Carroll, twice. He has also been found guilty of tax fraud by the State of New York ending in a settlement of nearly half a billion dollars. Given this, we are talking about a man who seems to lack the virtues that Kant argues are so important to a civil society: honesty, accountability, and responsibility. Yet, Republicans continue to deny the facts and support Trump creating an atmosphere of lies all up and down the Republican ballot. More than that, their lies have sown seeds of doubt concerning central features of our democracy, i.e., the veracity of the justice system and the voting process.
This is not a little thing. While lying is wrong, according to Kant, creating a context of lies is much worse than a “material,” or what we have called a “white lie,” because it violates the “principle of right.” It therefore undermines the tapestry of honesty needed to maintain a free and open society. If a political party is known to be liars, then they are liable for these lies and should have no role in the U.S. political process. Even the conservatively leaning Hoover Institution comments “Sustaining a healthy society requires more than capitalism and democracy. It takes a commitment to moral renewal.” Moral renewal means telling the truth and striving not to tell lies, regardless of the circumstances. It means becoming citizens of character not people who, lacking character, believe it is alright to tell a lie.
A lie is a denial of the truth. This sounds obvious, but many ignore this simple truth in favor of the ends they desire. My students wanted the homeowner to lie to protect their friend. Others tell lies to protect the feelings of those to whom they are close. Some tell lies to avoid legal liability. Whatever the reason, telling lies is a problem especially when doing so makes others believe that lying is appropriate. It violates the principle of right and ultimately, erases the truth. With the erasure of truth, civilized society becomes an impossibility. So, with Kant, we can say categorically, one ought to be honest and tell the truth because a lie is always a lie and lying is always wrong. Right?

Works Referenced
- Knt, E. (1993) “On the supposed right to lie because of philanthropic concerns.” in Grounding for the metaphysics of morals. Trnaslated by James W. Ellington, Kindle Edition. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., Inc.
- Varden, H. (2010). Kant and lying to the murderer at the door… One more time: Kant’s legal philosophy and lies to murderers and Nazis. Journal of Social Philosophy 41(4), 403-421.